IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.
Anil Chauhan and another - Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. - Respondent
Cr. MMO No. 353 of 2018
Decided On : 17-09-2018
Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Indian Penal Code - 279, 337, 338
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to quash FIR No. 152/2017, which was registered for rash and negligent driving. The parties had entered into a compromise and did not wish to pursue the case further.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the interest of justice would be met by quashing the proceedings as the parties had already compromised the matter.
Issues: The main issue was whether the court should quash the FIR and consequent proceedings in light of the compromise between the parties.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on precedents and legal principles to determine that the power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. It also considered the ultimate object of justice to find out the truth, punish the guilty, and protect the innocent.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition and ordered the quashing of FIR No.152/2017, along with consequent proceedings, as the parties had compromised the matter.
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), is maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 152/2017, dated 26.06.2017, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.
2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 26.06.2017, Jagdish Chand/complainant (hereinafter to be called as “the complainant”), was standing upon the roof of the house of Joginder Singh near Hot Spice Restaurant. At about 7:00 a.m., he saw that one motorcycle, coming from Dosadka side hit by a car coming from Hamirpur side. On investigation, it was found that motorcycle was being driven by Ajay Kumar (petitioner No. 2) and car being driven by Anil Kumar (petitioner No. 1). As per the complainant, the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the car driver, Anil Kumar. Accordingly, FIR, No. 152/2017, dated 26.06.2017, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, came to be registered against petitioner No. 1. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise (Annexure P-3) and they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-3), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court may be quashed and set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence of rash and negligent driving on public way is offence against the society and it cannot be compounded/quashed on the basis of settlement between the offender and victim, so the present petition may be dismissed.
5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire records in detail.
6. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.
[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not s
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