IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
Gurkiran Kaur and Ors. – Appellant
Vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh – Respondent
Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 49 of 2019
Decided On : 24-01-2019
Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Indian Penal Code, Section 34, Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought quashing of F.I.R. under Sections 406, 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, citing compromise between the parties.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the interest of justice would be met by quashing the proceedings as the parties had already compromised the matter.
Issues: The main issue was whether the court should exercise its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings in light of the compromise between the parties.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on precedents such as B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand and another, and Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and another, emphasizing the power of the court to quash criminal proceedings in appropriate cases to meet the ends of justice, especially in matrimonial disputes.
Final Decision: The court exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code and quashed the F.I.R. and the proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate.
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
The present petition is maintained by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 536/2018, dated 13.11.2018, under Sections 406, 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, registered at Police Station, Una, District Una, H.P.
2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 20.5.2018, petitioner No.1/complainant was married to petitioner No.2-Parmod Kumar, in accordance with Sikh rites and customs at Gurudwara Baba Jawahar Singh Ji, Village Majara, P.O. Sanoli, Tehsil and District Una. As per petitioner No.1/complainant, behaviour of accused persons were remained cordial, only for few days, thereafter, all the accused persons started harassment and maltreatment on account of the demands of dowry and saying that her father is businessmen and has not given a single penny in the marriage and demanding Rs.ten lacs. It is further submitted that petitioner No.1/complainant did not disclose this fact to her parents that the accused persons are harassing her for bringing Rs.ten lacs. As per petitioner No.1, due to the intervention of elder family members and other respectful persons of the society, the parties have to settle the matrimonial dispute amicably without any fear and pressure have resolved the matter. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide written compromise, dated 26.12.2018, (Annexure P-2) and do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide written compromise (Annexure P-2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the present petition may be dismissed.
5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.
6. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.
[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercis
B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675
Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others
Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand and another
Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal & Others
Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and another
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