The main legal point established in the judgment is that the court has the inherent power under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings in appropriate cases to meet the ends of justice, especially when the parties have settled the dispute amicably.

JUDGMENT :

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.

1. The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 17/2017, dated 12.3.2017, under Section 4 (1) (r) (s) of the Scheduled Caste and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and Section 506, 323 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, as well police report filed under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, registered at Police Station, Ani, District Kullu, H.P.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 11.3.2017, Smt. Kamla Thakur, wife of Shri Parkash Chand, resident of Village Chanot, organized a party at her house, on account of her being elected as Ward Panch from Maroldal Ward. In that party, petitioners alongwith other villages were also present. When the party was going on at the house of Kamla Thakur, after eating food, certain persons started dancing, where respondents No.2 and 3 also joined them. After sometime, petitioners came there and started abusing them and saying racial remarks that they cannot dance there and gave beatings to them. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, dated 26.2.2019, Annexure P-2, and they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No.2 and 3, has argued that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Honb’le Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Co