The main legal principle established in the judgment is that in cases where parties have settled disputes amicably and without pressure, the criminal proceedings can be quashed to meet the ends of justice.

JUDGMENT :

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.

The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), is maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 123/14, dated 22.07.2014, under Sections 498A & 506 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Shimla West (Boileauganj) H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that marriage between the petitioner and respondent No. 4 was solemnized on 20.06.2009 at Jaipur as per Hindu rites and ceremonies and they lived together till 2014. However, thereafter due to some differences in opinion with the petitioner, respondent No. 4 left the matrimonial house and started living at her parental house at Shimla and on 22.07.2014, she got registered FIR No. 123/14, dated 22.07.2014, against the petitioner. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise (Annexure P-4) and in order to maintain their cordial relations, they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-4), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire records in detail.

6. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand and another, (201