IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
Harman Kaur - Appellant
Vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh And Another - Respondents
Cr. MMO No. 147 of 2019
Decided On : 01-05-2019
Compromise - Quashing of FIR - Section 279, Section 337 of the Indian Penal Code - Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought quashing of F.I.R No. 28/2018, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, based on a compromise between the parties.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that as per the compromise deed, the interest of justice would be met by quashing the proceedings, and thus exercised jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code to quash the FIR and the proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate.
Issues: The main issue was whether the compromise between the parties warranted the quashing of the FIR and the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on precedents and legal principles to establish that the interest of justice would be met by quashing the proceedings based on the compromise between the parties.
Final Decision: The court ordered the quashing of F.I.R No.28/2018, dated 19.3.2018, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, and the proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate.
JUDGMENT :
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 28/2018, dated 19.3.2018, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station, Dharampur, District Solan, H.P.
2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 19.3.2018, at about 1:45 p.m, petitioner driving a vehicle bearing registration No.PB-65AK-0005 (Toyata Fortuner) and when reached at Bypass road Kumarhatti near Mahindra Show Room, in a very high speed, struck against the vehicle Mahindra XUV-500, due to which, respondent No.2 received simple injuries. The vehicle in question was being driven by the petitioner in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others. On the basis of which, respondent No.2 reported the matter to the police and FIR was lodged. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, dated 01.11.2018, Annexure C-2/A, and do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure C-2/A), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.
5. Respondent No.2, submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.
6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.
7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
(6) In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers
(8) It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.
(15) In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.
8. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta and anot
B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another
Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal & Others
Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and another
Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others vs. State of Gujarat and another
Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others
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