IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.
Lajma Kanwar and Another - Appellants
Versus
State of H.P. and Another - Respondents
Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 448 of 2019
Decided On : 01-10-2019
Compromise - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Code of Criminal Procedure - Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners sought to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings arising from allegations of harassment and dowry demands, as the parties had settled their dispute through a Compromise Deed.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the compromise between the parties and their desire to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent warranted the quashing of the criminal proceedings to meet the ends of justice.
Issues: The main issue was whether the compromise between the parties justified the quashing of the criminal proceedings under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on precedents and legal principles to establish that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked to quash criminal proceedings when the parties have settled their dispute amicably and in the interest of justice.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition and ordered the quashing of the FIR and consequent proceedings under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC, as the parties had compromised the matter and did not wish to proceed further with the case.
JUDGMENT :
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), has been maintained by the petitioners for quashing of F.I.R. No. 18/2015, dated 23.12.2015, under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as "IPC"), registered at Women Police Station BCS, Shimla, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.
2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that marriage between petitioner No. 2 and respondent No. 2 was solemnized in the year 2015. After some time of marriage they lived together, however, thereafter the petitioners starting harassing respondent No.2 for bringing lesser dowry, as such, respondent No.2 left her matrimonial house and lodged FIR No. 18 of 2015 against the petitioners. Consequently, a case under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC, came to be registered against the petitioners. However, now the parties have settled their dispute vide Compromise Deed, Annexure P-2, whereby petitioner No.2 and respondent No.2 have decided to settled the dispute between them amicably and want to dissolve the marriage by way of mutual consent, so that both the parties can live peacefully. Hence, the present petition.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter vide compromise deed, Annexure P-2, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, therefore, the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court, may be quashed and set aside.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.
5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.
6. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.
[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Co
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