The court can exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings when the parties have reached a genuine settlement, in order to meet the ends of justice.

JUDGMENT :

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.

The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), has been maintained by the petitioners for quashing of F.I.R No. 229/17, dated 17.09.2017, under Sections 452, 326, 307, 324, 323, 147, 148, 149, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Indora, District Kangra, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 17.09.2017, some conversation took place between the daughter of the complainant and her husband over phone. Accordingly, petitioner No. 1 came to the house of the complainant alongwith petitioners No. 2 to 5 and started arguing with the wife of complainant (respondent No. 3). Suddenly, petitioner No. 2 attacked respondent No. 3 with sickle (drat) on her head, due to which, blood started oozing from her head and on seeing this, the petitioners ran away from the spot. On the complaint of complainant, FIR No. 229/2017, dated 17.09.2017, under Sections 452,323,147,148 and 149 IPC was registered against the petitioner. After recording the statements of the witnesses and obtaining medical opinion of the Doctor, Sections 324,326,504,506 and 307 IPC were further added in the FIR. However, now the parties have compromised the matter and in order to maintain their relations cordial, they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter and respondents No. 2 and 3 have sworn in their affidavits, stating therein that they have no objections if the proceedings are dropped, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence, the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court, may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

5. Learned Deputy Advocate General has argued that since the petitioner has committed a heinous crime, the present petition deserves dismissal.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the pu