The main legal point established in the judgment is the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR in appropriate cases to meet the ends of justice and the importance of encouraging genuine settlements of disputes.

JUDGMENT :

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.

The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 70/15, dated 01.05.2015, under Sections 336 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Bhuntar, District Kullu, H.P., along with all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 23.04.2015, father of respondents No. 3 and 4 (late Sh. Gehar Singh) allegedly came in contact with electrical line allegedly lying loose at NHPC Stage-II, Kullu, due to which, he fell unconscious and sustained injuries and was shifted to Civil Hospital, Kullu and gain consciousness after three days of alleged incident. Consequently, FIR No. 70/2015, dated 01.05.2015, under Sections 336 and 337 of IPC, came to be registered against the petitioners, who are working and posted as Electrical Engineer and Engineer, respectively, with NHPC Stage-II, District Kullu. All medical expenses spent for medical treatment of Gehar Singh (Since deceased) were borne out by the employer of the petitioners and after full recovery, he was discharged from Hospital. On 22.08.2015, Gehar Singh died of natural death. However, now respondents No. 3 and 4, being legal heirs of the deceased, have settled the dispute with the petitioners, since their father (deceased) was not interested in prosecuting the petitioners and died of natural death, not due to electrocution and negligence on the part of the petitioners. To this effect, the parties have placed on record Compromise Deed, Annexure P-3 and do not want to continue with the case, in order to maintain their relations cordial. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter vide compromise deed, Annexure P-3, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, since the deceased had died of natural death, not on account of electrocution and negligence on the part of the petitioners, thus, the FIR, along with consequent proceedings arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court, may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 3 and 4 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

5. Learned Additional Advocate General has argued that taking into consideration the gravity of offence, the compromise between the parties, is not sustainable and the present petition deserves dismissal.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it