The main legal principle established in the judgment is the importance of securing the ends of justice, encouraging genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, and considering the societal implications of certain offenses in deciding whether to quash criminal proceedings.

JUDGMENT :

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.

The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 29/16, dated 21.02.2016, under Sections 498 A and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., along with all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 21.02.2016, respondent No. 2 was doing pooja in her house at upper Swana and accidentally her clothes caught fire, due to which, she got burnt. However, as per the allegations of complainant/respondent No. 3 (father of the victim), the petitioner used to maltreat his daughter for bringing lesser dowry and his daughter was burnt by the petitioner. On the complaint of complainant, FIR No. 29/2016, dated 21.02.2016, under Sections 498 A and 307 of IPC, came to be registered against the petitioner. However, now the parties are living together in harmony and want to live happy and successful married life, as such, they have compromised the matter and have agreed to end all the criminal cases, including the present case. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter vide compromise deed, Annexure P-3, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, since the petitioner and respondent No. 2 (victim) are living happy and harmonious life, hence, the FIR, along with consequent proceedings arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court, may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

5. Learned Deputy Advocate General has argued that since the petitioner has committed a heinous crime, the present petition deserves dismissal.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a po