IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
Sanjeev Kumar - Appellant
Vs.
State of H.P. And Others - Respondents
Criminal Miscellaneous M O No. 401 of 2019
Decided On : 09-08-2019
Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Indian Penal Code, Sections 279 and 337 - The court discussed the powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases. It emphasized that the ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. The court also highlighted the need for exercising utmost care and caution while invoking such powers and the importance of encouraging genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought quashing of F.I.R No. 8/18, dated 23.01.2018, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Chopal, District Shimla, H.P., as the parties had arrived at a compromise.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the interest of justice would be met by quashing the proceedings, as the parties had already compromised the matter.
Issues: The main issue was whether the F.I.R and consequent proceedings should be quashed in light of the compromise between the parties.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, emphasizing the need to find out the truth, punish the guilty, and protect the innocent. It also highlighted the importance of exercising utmost care and caution while invoking the powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition and ordered the quashing of F.I.R No. 8/18, dated 23.01.2018, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, along with consequent proceedings pending before the trial Court.
JUDGMENT :
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 8/18, dated 23.01.2018, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Chopal, District Shimla, H.P., along with all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.
2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 23.01.2018, an accident took place near Thudna Kainchi and as per complainant/respondent No. 2, the accident has occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the petitioner, since his vehicle was 150 meters behind the vehicle of petitioner, consequently, he lodged F.I.R No. 8/18, dated 23.01.2018, against the petitioner. However, now the parties have arrived at compromise, vide compromise Deed, Annexure P-2 and in order to maintain their relation cordial, they do not want to pursue the case against each other, as the FIR has been registered by the complainant without knowing the real cause of accident, however after knowing the fact of accident, he wants to withdraw the FIR. Hence the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed Annexure P-2, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, along with consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court may be quashed and set aside.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2 to 5 have argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.
5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.
6. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.
[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.
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