IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.
Rajinder Prashad - Appellant
Versus
State of H.P. and Others - Respondents
Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 373 of 2019
Decided On : 01-08-2019
Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Indian Penal Code - 279, 337 - 320, 482, 226 - The court discussed the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and its wide powers to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. It referred to various precedents to establish that the court can quash criminal proceedings if the parties have settled the dispute amicably and if it is in the interest of justice. The court emphasized the need to prevent abuse of the process of the court and secure the ends of justice.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought quashing of an FIR registered under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code due to a car accident. The parties had settled their dispute and did not want to pursue the case against each other.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that as the parties had already compromised the matter and there were bleak chances of conviction, it was in the interest of justice to quash the proceedings.
Issues: The main issue was whether the court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code to quash the FIR and consequent proceedings due to the compromise between the parties.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on precedents and legal principles to establish that it had the power to quash criminal proceedings if the parties had settled the dispute amicably and if it was in the interest of justice.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition and ordered the quashing of the FIR and consequent proceedings as the parties had already compromised the matter.
JUDGMENT :
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 239/18, dated 07.12.2018, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Theog, District Shimla, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.
2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 07.12.2018, respondent No. 2/complainant alongwith his wife was coming to Shimla from his Village at Lahoti, around 1:00 p.m., when he reached near Dev Bhoomi Cold Store, Matiyana, a car, bearing registration No. HP-06A-1476, being driven by the present petitioner, came from opposite side and collided with his car, due to which, he sustained injuries. As per the complainant, the accident has occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the petitioner, consequently, F.I.R No. 239/18, dated 07.12.2018, came to be registered against the petitioner. However, now the parties have settled their dispute, vide compromise Deed, Annexure P-2 and in order to maintain their relation cordial, they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.
3. Learned vice counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed Annexure P-2, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court may be quashed and set aside.
4. Learned vice counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.
5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.
6. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.
[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code doe
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