The main legal principle established is that the High Court can quash criminal proceedings to meet the ends of justice, particularly in cases of compromise between the parties.

JUDGMENT :

CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.

1. The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No.43 of 2018, dated 8.2.2018, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 185 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station, Sadar, District Mandi, H.P.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 7.2.2018 respondent No.1-complainant went to attend a marriage of his friend, namely, Tej Singh, in a vehicle motorcycle bearing registration No.HP-33C-3266, where petitioner was also there. Thereafter, attending the marriage, they went to near Gampul Chowk, around 10:30 p.m, in a vehicle motorcycle bearing registration No.HP-33C-3266, being driven by the petitioner in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others, fell down from the road, due to which, respondent No.1-complainant received simple injuries as well third pillion rider on the motorcycle, namely, Vishal, who had received grievous injuries. On the basis of which, respondent No.1 reported the matter to the police and FIR was lodged. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, dated 24.6.2019, Annexure P-1, and they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-1), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel for respondent No.1, submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

5. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold t