The main legal point established in the judgment is that the interest of justice can be met by quashing criminal proceedings based on a compromise between the parties, as per the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and relevant case law.

JUDGMENT :

CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.

1. The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 210 of 2011, dated 5.6.2011, under Sections 354, 452 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 5.6.2011, respondent No.2 came to Police Station alongwith sisters, namely, Babli Devi and Kamla Devi, alleging therein that they are raising house over the land of Partap Katoch (father of the petitioner). At about 6:00 p.m, respondent No.2 was at the house alongwith her sister Babli, Lakshmi and Dilmaya (grandmother). Respondent No.2 alongwith her sister were sleeping in the room, when the petitioner came there and started touching her breast, legs and private parts, on which, she woke up and asked the petitioner as to what he was doing. Her sister also woke up, the petitioner again started touching her breast and hug her, but again pushed her due to which, respondent No.2 sustained injury on her head, when her sister, Babli Devi, tried to rescue respondent No.2, the petitioner struck her with a stick (danda). On the basis of which, respondent No.2 reported the matter to the police and FIR was registered. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, (Annexure P-5), and they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-5), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and