The main legal principle established is that the interest of justice and the settlement between the parties can justify the quashing of criminal proceedings, especially in cases of non-compoundable offences involving compromises.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 309/2019, dated 13.10.2019, under Sections 279, 337 & 338 of the Indian Penal code (for short "IPC") and Section 187 of Motor Vehicles Act (for short " the Act"), registered at Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings, arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts giving rise to the present petition are that on 13.10.2019, respondent No. 2/complainant (for short "the complainant") was going to his office in a scooter, around 05:40 a.m. when he reached near Siddhivinayak Temple, a car coming in a high speed, hit him, due to which, he sustained injuries on his head and face. After hitting the scooter, the driver of the offending vehicle fled away from the spot. As per the complainant, the offending vehicle was being driven by the petitioner in a rash and negligent manner. Accordingly, FIR No. 309/2019, dated 13.10.2019, under Sections 279, 337 & 338 of IPC and Section 187 of the Act, came to be registered against the petitioner. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise (Annexure P-2) and in order to maintain their relations cordial, they do not want to continue with the case. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner, therefore, FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the FIR, pending before the learned Court below may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence of rash and negligent driving on public way is offence against the society and it cannot be compounded/quashed on the basis of settlement between the offender and victim, so the present petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire records in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR