The central legal principle established in the judgment is that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code can be used to quash criminal proceedings when a genuine settlement has been reached between the parties, even in non-compoundable offences.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), is maintained by the petitioners for quashing of F.I.R No. 49/2018, dated 07.03.2018, under Sections 341, 323, 506 and 353 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as "IPC"), registered at Police Station Amb, District Una, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 07.03.2018, around 2:30 p.m., when petitioner No. 2/complainant (hereinafter to be called as "the complainant"), was performing his duties as Gram Rojgar Sewak in Gram Panchayat Ladoli and carrying out survey of the BPL families, petitioner No. 1 came there, wrongfully restrained him and started beating him with stick, due to which, he sustained injuries on his ribs. Consequently, F.I.R No. 49/2018, dated 07.03.2018, under Sections 341, 323, 506 and 353 IPC, came to be registered against petitioner No. 1. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise (Annexure P-2) and in order to maintain their relations cordial, they do not want to continue with the case. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that there is sufficient evidence on record to proceed against the petitioner and to secure his conviction, as such, the present petition may be dismissed.

5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire records in detail.

6. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedin