The court can exercise its inherent power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to meet the ends of justice, particularly when the parties have settled the dispute amicably.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition is maintained by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 250 of 2018, dated 15.11.2018, registered at Police Station, Sadar, District Shimla, under Sections 452, 323, 427, 504, 506 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that on 15.11.2018, some unknown persons came to the liquor vend situated at Old Bus Stand Shimla, owned by respondent No.2, started abusing the salesman as well as respondent No.2 and tried to enter the shop of liquor vend for some reason and had some scuffle with him, due to this, respondent No.2 called the Police Station for some assistance, but the said persons left the spot after the incident. The petitioners while driving on their way back home via Old Bus Stand and on seeing the liquor vend open and asked for two bottles of beer, but respondent No.2, refused to do the same, started gave beatings to him. Pursuant thereto, statement of respondent No.2 came to the Police Station for lodging FIR against the petitioners. Now, respondent No.2 entered into a compromise, on the basis of compromise deed Annexure P-2, stated that he does not want to pursue the case against the petitioners. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise o