IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
Ajmer Singh - Appellant
Versus
State Of H.P. & Ors. - Respondent
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition (Main) No. 11 of 2020
Decided On : 03-03-2020
Compromise - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Indian Penal Code, Section 307; Arms Act, Section 25-54-59
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought to quash an FIR under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25-54-59 of the Arms Act, citing a compromise between the parties. The respondent sustained injuries in an altercation, but later entered into a compromise deed stating they did not want to pursue the case.
Finding of the Court:
The court considered the precedents and held that the interest of justice would be met by quashing the proceedings, as the parties had already compromised the matter.
Issues: The main issue was whether the court should exercise its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings in light of the compromise between the parties.
Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on precedents to establish that the interest of justice would be served by quashing the proceedings, especially in cases where the parties have settled the dispute amicably and without pressure.
Final Decision: The court ordered the quashing of the FIR and the proceedings pending before the trial court, considering the compromise between the parties.
JUDGMENT
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as the Code ) for quashing of F.I.R No. 400 of 2016, dated 28.12.2016, under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25-54-59 of Arms Act, registered at Police Station, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P.
2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that on 28.12.2016, respondent No. 2 was going to Village Garan alongwith his cousin brother (respondent No.3) in his Car. At about 4:30 p.m, when they reached Khehar near Sainik Academy and were talking to their friends, the petitioner came there and asked them to remove their vehicle. Upon which, respondents No.2 and 3 responded by saying that since now they are talking to their friends, they will remove their vehicle after sometime. In the meanwhile, the petitioner opened the door of a Maruti Car parked there and returned with a baseball bat and started beating to respondent No.2, due to which, he sustained injury on his left arm and shoulder. When respondent No.3 stepped out of the vehicle and tried to compromise the matter, the petitioner has taken out his pistol and fired two bullet shots on him, due to which he sustained injuries on his left shoulder. Pursuant thereto, statement of respondent No.2 came to the Police Station for lodging FIR against the petitioner. Now, respondent No.2 entered into a compromise, on the basis of compromise deed, Annexure P-1, stated that they do not want to pursue the case against the petitioner. Hence, the present petition.
3. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.
5. Learned counsel for respondents No.2 and 3, submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.
6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.
7. Their Lordships of the Hon ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.
[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would n
B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another
Inder Mohan Goswami and Another vs. State of Uttaranchal & Others
Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and another
Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others vs. State of Gujarat and another
Pepsi Food Ltd. and another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others
Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand and another
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