The main legal principle established is that quashing of FIR and criminal proceedings can be done to meet the ends of justice, especially in cases of compromise between the parties.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition is maintained by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 16 of 2019, dated 27.1.2019, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Shimla East, District Shimla, H.P.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that on 27.1.2019, respondent No.2, boarded a private bus at village Dharla, Post Office Suma Kothi, Tehsil Karsog, District Mandi, which was coming from Karsog to Shimla. At about 11:30 a.m, he alighted from the bus at Talland, Shimla, as the said bus was going to ISBT, Shimla. Another bus, bearing registration No.HP63A-3709 also stopped at Talland, Shimla, which was coming from Karsog. When he was standing near traffic police post (Gumti) all of sudden, driver of bus bearing registration No.HP63A-3709, turned the bus towards Khalini side and driven the same over his left foot, as a result of which, respondent No.2 received simple as well as grievous injuries. Consequently, FIR No. No. 16 of 2019, dated 27.1.2019, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, came to be registered against the petitioner. Now, respondent No.2 entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, Annexure P-3, and stated that he does not want to pursue the case against the petitioner. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, 2003 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, 1998 5 SCC 749 , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of