The central legal point established is that the court can exercise its powers under Section 482 of the Code to quash criminal proceedings based on a compromise between the parties, in order to meet the ends of justice.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. —The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 54/16, dated 12.02.2016, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal code, registered at Police Station, West Shimla, H.P.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 12.02.2016 petitioner along with his batchmate of B.Tech course in Chitkara University, Baddi, namely Manmeet Kaur Grewal, were going towards Shimla for attending the family function of their friend. When they reached Taradevi, all of a sudden, one stray dog came in front of the vehicle and the petitioner, who was driving the vehicle suddenly applied the brakes, as a result of which the vehicle skidded and fell down into a deep gorge about 150 feet down from the main road. Respondent No. 2, who was coming from the opposite side, on seeing the car rolling down into a deep gorge made phone calls to the concerned Police Station and the rescue team. His only anxiety was to protect the occupants of the vehicle by any means. The intention of respondent No. 2 was only to protect the occupants of the vehicle, whereas Police have treated his information as an eye witness, to lodge FIR. In this context, respondent No. 2 has executed an affidavit (Annexure P-2) stated therein that the occupants were young boy and a girl and they were driving safely. Respondent No. 2 specifically substantiate that he has only intimated the Police Officials to sent rescue team. Both the occupants of the said vehicle were received injuries, initially they were taken to Indira Gandhi Medical College, Shimla, wherefrom they were shifted to PGI, Chandigarh, where petitioner remained admitted for several days. Though, concerned Doctors of the PGI, Chandigarh have discharged the petitioner, but petitioner is still undergoing treatment. Apart from the occupants of the vehicle, there was no injury caused to any other person. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed Annexure P-4, and do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-4), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan pending before the learned Court below may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Deputy Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 has argued that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749) , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal''s case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of jus