The main legal point established in the judgment is that the interest of justice can be met by quashing criminal proceedings when the parties have already compromised the matter, especially in cases related to matrimonial disputes.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition is maintained by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F. I. R No. 205/17, dated 30. 10. 2017, under Sections 279, 337, 201 of the Indian Penal code and 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station, Amb, District Una, H. P.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 30. 10. 2017, at about 8:00 PM, when the petitioner was coming back from his office to his home, one car overtake his car and hit the scooty coming from the front side, due to which, respondents No. 3 and 4, sustained injuries. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide written. Compromise, dated 15. 11. 2017, Annexure P-2, and do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide written Compromise (Annexure P-2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Assistant Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Mr. Naveen Awasthi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2 to 4, has argued that S/Shri Sachin Shandil, Birbal and Prem Chand/respondents No. 2 to 4/injured, have settled their dispute with the petitioner and have amicably compromised the matter and in view of this, they do not want to continue with the present matter.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court B. S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another , 2003 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others , 1998 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal''s case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts.

Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye''s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.

8. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand and another , 2010 7 SCC 667, have held that the ulti