The main legal point established in the judgment is that the court has the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code to quash criminal proceedings based on a compromise between the parties, in order to meet the ends of justice.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No.223/2012, dated 15.10.2012, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P, pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, titled State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nirmal Singh & ors.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 15.10.2012, respondent No.2-Chhota Ram alongwith his wife Smt. Shankru Devi, boarded HRTC bus bearing No.HP12D-8274, which was enroute from Hamirpur to Chandigarh, to return back to his house, when the said bus reached at Talsari just ahead Kallar, around 6:15 pm, respondent No.2 went to Conductor to stop the bus and the bus was got stopped. Respondent No.2 got down from the bus in front of the door, then all of sudden, petitioner No.1, blew whistle and despite the door was opened, petitioner No.2- driver started the bus, on account of which, Shankru Devi, sustained injuries on her head. The said accident took place due to the rashness and negligence on the part of petitioners. The complainant narrated the whole incident to the police, on the basis of which, FIR was lodged. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide written Compromise (Annexure P-3) and do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide written Compromise (Annexure P-3), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the present petition may be dismissed.

5. Mr. Munish Datwalia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 has argued that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another , (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others , (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal''s case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye''s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise