The main legal principle established is that the High Court has the power to quash criminal proceedings in appropriate cases, especially in matrimonial disputes, to meet the ends of justice and encourage genuine settlements.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), is maintained by the petitioners for quashing of F.I.R No. 110 of 2015, dated 25.06.2015, under Sections 147, 149, 341 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code , registered at Police Station Shahpur, District Kangra, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 25.06.2015, due to some misunderstanding a minor dispute arose between the petitioners and respondents No. 2 to 4, as such, an F.I.R. No. 110 of 2015, dated 25.06.2015 came to be registered against the petitioners at the instance of complainant, late Sh. Subhash Chand. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise (Annexure P-3) and in order to maintain their cordial relations, they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-3), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2 to 4 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire records in detail.

6. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749) , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal''s case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye''s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.

7. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand and another, (2010) 7 SCC 667 , have held that the ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect