The main legal principle established in the judgment is that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be used to quash criminal proceedings if the parties have settled the dispute amicably and without any pressure, even in non-compoundable offenses, in order to encourage genuine settlements of disputes and secure the ends of justice.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 126 of 2019 dated 12.10.2019, under Sections 451, 354, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station, Bhoranj, District Hamirpur, H.P.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that on 11.10.2019 statement of respondent No.2 was recorded by the police in Civil Hospital, Bhoranj, wherein she has stated that about six years back, she was married with one Shri Ajay Kumar and out of the wedlock two daughters were born. The petitioner, about two years back, started teasing her and despite requests, he did not mend his ways. She disclosed this fact to her sister-inlaw. On 11.10.2019, the petitioner came to her house armed with a darat (sickle) and when she opened the door, he fled away. Respondent No.2 chased him, but when she saw that the petitioner is armed with a darat, she came back. Later on, the petitioner returned and openly said that respondent No.2 telephonically asked him to come, so she swallowed tablet of pesticide and she was rushed to Civil Hospital, Bhoranj. Pursuant thereto, statement of respondent No.2, police registered a case against the petitioner. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, dated 30.10.2019, Annexure P-1, and they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2, submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6. In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal''s case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye''s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circ