The main legal principle established is that the court can quash criminal proceedings to meet the ends of justice, particularly when the parties have settled the dispute amicably.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 26 of 2019, dated 15.2.2019, under Sections 279, 337, 338 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 181 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station, Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 15.2.2019, petitioner was going to Danoa on his motorcycle bearing No.HP40A-0858 TVS Victor, at the same time, respondent No.3 was also going to Danoa, on his motorcycle Model Apache Temporary bearing No.HP-22T-9660. Around 1:15 p.m, when the petitioner as well respondent No.3 reached at Bharyalu, the petitioner tried to overtake motorcycle being driven by respondent No.3, but due to rash and negligent driving and error of judgment on his part, he hit his motorcycle, thereafter, a private bus bearing No.HP68-A0374, which was coming from the opposite side and was stopped by the driver, on the road side, after seeing the speeding motorcycle. The petitioner, who was driving his bike, applied his break on looking the bus and at that time the bike was skid and struck against the bus, as a result of which, petitioner sustained simple as well as grievous injuries on his person. On the basis of which, respondent No.3 reported the matter to the police and FIR was lodged. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, dated 19.8.2019, Annexure P-3, and do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-3), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.3, submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6. In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal''s case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye''s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary