The main legal point established is that the High Court has the inherent power under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings to meet the ends of justice, especially in cases of compromise between the parties.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing of F.I.R No. 196 of 2019 dated 28.8.2019, under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station, Shimla West, District Shimla, H.P.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that on 11th July, 2014, petitioner took respondent No.1 in his Maruti Car to an isolated place, where he forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her. When, respondent No.1 started weeping, the petitioner promised to marry her. Thereafter, the petitioner repeatedly developed physical relations with her. After the completion of graduation by respondent No.1, she started taking coaching and taken on rent a room at Tutu. The petitioner started regularly visiting the house of respondent No.1, especially when she was all alone. During this period, respondent No.1 also became pregnant on one or two occasions, but the pregnancy was to be aborted. On 26.8.2019, respondent No.1 came to know that the petitioner has been engaged to a girl and they are doing to marry soon. When, respondent No.1 confronted the petitioner about such marriage, he started threatening her. Pursuant thereto, FIR came to be registered against the petitioner. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, dated 22.9.2019, Annexure P-4, and they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel for respondent No.1, submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

5. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 , have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6. In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal''s case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye''s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a differe