JUDGMENT :

CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.

1. The instant petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 19 of 2020, dated 17.5.2020, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as “IPC”), registered at Police Station, Nankhari, District Shimla, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that respondent No.2- Parmod Kumar, son of Shri Devi Singh, resident of village Dharoli, Post Office Khuni, Nankhari, District Shimla, made a statement, under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before the police, alleging therein that he is an agriculturist and for the last 3-4 months unwell, as he had been operated. The petitioner, who is a student, is a son of his brother-in-law. On 17.5.2020, the petitioner alongwith his mother and wife’s paternal aunt (bua) drove a vehicle, bearing No.HP63A-6839 (Ford Eco Sport), was coming to the house of respondent No.2, for asking his wellbeing. When the petitioner reached near the house of respondent No.2 and was parking his vehicle on the edge of the road, respondent No.2 was watching from the roof of his house that the petitioner, at the first instance, parked his vehicle, on the road side. Thereafter, the petitioner and the occupants of the vehicle alighted, however, the petitioner again boarded the vehicle to recheck as to whether the vehicle has been parked properly or not. Thereafter, the petitioner again started the vehicle and parked the same and in the meanwhile, the vehicle rolled down 100 meters from the road. Resultantly, the petitioner received simple injuries. As a sequel to the statement of respondent No.2, recorded under Section 154 Cr. P.C., police registered an FIR against the petitioner. Now, respondent No.2 entered into a compromise, on the basis of compromise deed, (Annexure P-2), stating therein that he does not want to pursue the case against the petitioner. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where th