JUDGMENT :

CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.

1. The instant petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), has been maintained by the petitioners for quashing of F.I.R No. 360, dated 26.09.2020, under Sections 324, 323, 504 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as “IPC”), registered at Police Station Sadar-Una, District Una, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 26.09.2020, the complainant (respondent No. 2 herein) made a complaint to the police, wherein it has been alleged that the accused persons are his brothers and he is living separately from them, but on one pretext or the other his brothers keep harassing his family and today they made allegations against his wife that she took their 700/- Rupees. As per the complainant, the petitioners also abused his wife and when he reached at the spot and asked what is going on, the petitioners attacked him with “Darat”, owing to which, he sustained injuries. On the complaint of complainant, F.I.R No. 360, dated 26.09.2020, under Sections 324, 323, 504 and 34 of IPC, came to be registered against the petitioners. However, now the parties have compromised the matter and in order to maintain their relations cordial, they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence, the present petition.

3. Ms. Leena Guleria, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence, the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court, may be quashed and set aside.

4. Mr. Lalit K. Sehgal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

5. Learned Additional Advocate General has argued that taking into consideration the offence committed by the petitioners, the present petition deserves dismissal.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exer