Point of Law: Criminal Law - Seeking quash of FIR – Amicable Settlement between parties – Inheritance powers of the High Court - Invocation of jurisdiction of High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on ground that a settlement has been arrived at between offender and the victim is not same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, power of court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if offence is non compoundable

JUDGMENT :

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, Judge

The instant petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 80 of 2018, dated 4.4.2018, under Sections 279 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as “IPC”), registered at Police Station, Boileauganj (Shimla West), District Shimla, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that respondent No.2-Joginder Kumar, made a statement, under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before the police, alleging therein that he is a resident of Village Jadla (Kakkarhatti), Post Office Subathu, Tehsil Kasasuli, District Solan, H.P and working as a Driver, in a vehicle bearing registration No.HP-64-7158. On 4.4.2018, at about 2:35 p.m, petitioner drove a motorcycle bearing registration No.HP37D-4347 near Summerhill Boileauganj chowk, in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others and struck against a vehicle bearing registration No.HP-64-7158, as a result of which, motorcyclist fell far away from the spot. This accident has taken place due to the rash and negligent driving of the petitioner. Pursuant thereto, statement of respondent No.2 came to the Police Station for lodging FIR against the petitioner. Now, respondent No.2 entered into a compromise, on the basis of compromise deed (Annexure P-2) and stated that he does not want to pursue the case against the petitioner. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes neces