IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.
Smt. Santosh Sharma Wd/o Late Sh. Visheshwar Nath Sharma – Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh – Respondent
Criminal Misc. Petition (Main) No. 367 of 2021
Decided On : 17-08-2021
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Constitution of India,1950 - Article 226 - Indian Penal Code, 1908 - Sections 498-A, 406 and 506 - Criminal Intimidation - Matrimonial disputes - Compromise Deed - Parties have settled - petition are that marriage between respondent No 2/complainant and Vineet Sharma son of petitioner No. 1 was solemnized - whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
Finding of the Court:
Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice - High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in appropriate cases in order to meet the ends of justice and Section 320 of Code does not limit or affect powers of High Court under Section 482 of Code. Under circumstances, Court set aside impugned judgment of High Court passed in and quash proceedings in - Court finds that present is a fit case to exercise jurisdiction vested in Court, under Section 482 of Code.
Result: Petition is allowed.
JUDGMENT :
CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.
1. The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) has been maintained by the petitioners for quashing of F.I.R. No. 178/2013, dated 07.09.2013, under Sections 498A, 406 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as “IPC”) registered with Police Station Shimla West, alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R.
2. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that marriage between respondent No. 2/complainant and Vineet Sharma, son of petitioner No. 1 was solemnized on 07.02.2012. However, on 27.06.2013, Vineet Sharma has expired on account of illness. After the death of husband of respondent No. 2/complainant some differences arose in the family and petitioners started harassing respondent No. 2/complainant. Consequently, F.I.R. No. 178/2013, dated 07.09.2013, under Sections 498A, 406 and 506 of IPC, came to be registered against the petitioners. However, now the parties have settled their dispute amicably, vide Compromise Deed, Annexure P2 and in order to maintain their relations cordial, they do not want to continue with the cases, rather, they want to end all their litigations. Hence, the present petition.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter vide compromise deed, Annexure P2, no purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive, therefore, the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court, may be quashed and set aside.
4. Learned Additional Advocate General has argued that taking into consideration the seriousness of the matter, the present petition deserves dismissal.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.
6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the records in detail.
7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
(8) It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.
(15) In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inheren
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