The main legal point established in the judgment is the court's authority to quash criminal proceedings under section 482, emphasizing the importance of securing the ends of justice and encouraging genuine settlements, particularly in matrimonial disputes.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 03 of 2021, dated 20.03.2021, under Sections 363, 366A, 354, 376 IPC and Sections 4 and 12 of POCSO Act, registered at Female Police Station BCS, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R..

2. Tersely, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that on 20.03.2021 the mother of the victim (complainant) made a complaint to the police, wherein she stated that on19.03.2021 her daughter (victim herein), who is 15 years old, went missing. Despite extensive search efforts, the victim could not be traced. Upon the complaint, so made by the complainant, police registered F.I.R No. 03 of 2021, dated 20.03.2021, under Sections 363, 366A, 354, 376 IPC and Sections 4 and 12 of POCSO Act and the investigation ensued. Police investigation zeroed down on one Kamesh (petitioner herein), so he was arrested. However, now the parties have arrived at compromise, vide compromise Deed, Annexure P-2 and in order to maintain their relation cordial, they do not want to pursue the case against each other, as the FIR has been registered by the complainant without knowing the real cause of the incident, however after knowing the fact of the incident, she wants to withdraw the FIR, hence the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed Annexure P-2, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the same may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

6. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and othersvs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

"[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomesnecessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or F