The main legal point established is that the court can exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings when the parties have settled the dispute amicably and for the purpose of securing the ends of justice.

JUDGMENT

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as "the Code"), has been maintained by the petitioners for quashing of F.I.R No. 103/2016, dated 23.08.2016, under Sections 341, 323, 504 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as "IPC"), registered at Police Station New Shimla, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 23.08.2016, respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint against the petitioners, wherein it has been alleged that on 23.08.2016 when respondent No. 2 alongwith his friends was going to BCS, the petitioners who were in a Maruti car, overtook his car at Khalini and stopped him. Thereafter, the petitioners come out of the car and gave beatings to him, owing to which, he sustained injuries. The petitioners also hurled abuses to respondent No. 2. Consequently, F.I.R No. 103/2016, dated 23.08.2016, under Sections 341, 323, 504 and 34 of IPC, came to be registered against the petitioners. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise (Annexure P-1) and in order to maintain their relations cordial, they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-1), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, alongwith all consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 has argued that the present petition may be allowed, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties.

5. Learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence cannot be permitted to be compounded and the present petition deserves dismissal.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire records in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view o