ORDER :

The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 2/2014, dated 02.01.2014, under Sections 498A, 323 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as “IPC”), registered at Police Station Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P., alongwith consequent proceedings arising out of the said FIR.

2. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that marriage between the petitioner/husband and respondent No. 2/wife was solemnized in the month of May, 2013 according to the Hindu rites and ceremonies. After the said marriage, the parties lived peacefully and cordially for seven months. However, thereafter, differences arose between them and the wife has lodged a complaint against the petitioner, wherein allegations of harassment for bringing less dowry and maltreatment have been leveled. Consequently, F.I.R No. 2/2014, dated 02.01.2014, under Sections 498A, 323 and 34 of IPC, came to be registered against the petitionerhusband. However, now the parties have settled their dispute amicably, vide Compromise Agreement (Annexure P2), and as per terms of the said compromise, they do not want to continue with the present case. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter vide compromise agreement (Annexure P2), no purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive, therefore, the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings arising out of the same, may be quashed and set aside. 4. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2/complainant has argued that taking into consideration the fact that parties have settled their dispute amicably, the present petition may be allowed.

5. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that taking into consideration the seriousness of the matter, the present petition deserves dismissal.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the records in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the Hig