ORDER :

1. The present petition is maintained by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) for quashing of F.I.R. No. 121 of 2012, dated 10.7.2012, under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, registered at Police Station Amb, District Una, H.P. alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that respondent No. 2 made a complaint before the police alleging therein that on 13.10.2011, respondent No. 2 solemnized marriage with the petitioner at Village Sapouri, Tehsil Amb, District Una, according to Hindu Rites and ceremonies. After sometime, petitioner started maltreating respondent No. 2 regarding insufficient dowry and started treating her with cruelty. Pursuant thereto, statement of respondent No. 2 came to the Police Station for lodging FIR against the petitioners. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise before the Hon’ble Supreme Court Mediation Centre, in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 25677 of 2016, vide Settlement Agreement (Annexure P-3) dated 6th March, 2019, stating therein that respondent No. 2 does not want to pursue the case against the petitioners. However, respondent No. 2 has sent a letter dated 27.10.2021 before this Registry, wherein she has stated that she has no objection in case the present petition is allowed. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

6. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

(6) In Pepsi Food Ltd. and Another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

(8) It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

(15) In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powe