ORDER :

The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 124 of 2020, dated 18.08.2020, under Sections 354, 354-A (1), 354-D, 504, 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as “IPC”), registered at Police Station Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R.

2. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 18.08.2020, respondent No. 2/complainant made a written complaint against the petitioner, wherein it has been alleged that on 13.04.2020, when she was on night duty in Jawali Hospital, the petitioner harassed her and tried to molest her and he also threatened her with dire consequences. Thereafter, again on 11.07.2020, the petitioner dragged the complainant inside his room and misbehaved with her. Consequently, F.I.R No. 124 of 2020, dated 18.08.2020, under Sections 354, 354-A(1), 354-D, 504, 506 and 509 of IPC, came to be registered against the petitioner. However, now the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure A1) and in order to maintain their relation cordial they do not want to continue with the present case. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter vide Compromise Deed (Annexure A1), no purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive, therefore, the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings arising out of the same, may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2/complainant has argued that taking into consideration the fact that parties have settled their dispute amicably, the present petition may be allowed.

5. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that taking into consideration the seriousness of the matter, the present petition deserves dismissal.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the records in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Cou