ORDER :

The instant petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of the judgment dated 27.4.2015, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palampur, District Kangra, in Criminal Case No.159-II/2011 titled State vs. Uttam Chand, in F.I.R No.57 of 2011, dated 21.2.2011, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as “IPC”), registered at Police Station, Palampur, District Kangra, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that on 21.2.2011 around 6:40 p.m MHC Police Station, Palampur, received emergency call from 108 that an accident has taken place near University, on which, Police entered rapat Ex.PW1/A and recorded the statement of the complainant, namely, Sawroop Kumar, under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein he has reported that he is working as agent with Bajaj Allianz Insurance and had come to Palampur in connection with training of his Department. On 21.2.2011, after training in the evening while he was going to his house on his motorcycle bearing registration No.HP-37B-0437 around 6:10 pm, when he reached at place Station near University, then one Van came from Baijnath side in a high speed and struck against his motorcycle while going on his own side and after striking van with his motorcycle, he fell down on the side of the road and sustained injuries on his body. As a sequel to the statement of the complainant, police registered an FIR against the petitioner. Now, the complainant-Sawroop Chand, entered into a compromise, on the basis of compromise deed, dated 2nd January, 2019 (Annexure P-2), stating therein that he does not want to pursue the case against the petitioner. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

6. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under :

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India