ORDER :

The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 0148, dated 04.10.2020, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 04.10.2020, respondent No. 2/complainant filed a complaint at Police Station Dehra, wherein it has been alleged that today when he was going to Jawalaji on his Scooty and reached at place Sanot, he saw a black motor cycle in front of him. In the meantime, a white colour car came from Jawalaji side in a high speed and hit the aforesaid motor cycle. Due to which, the motor cyclist fell on road and sustained injuries on his face and body. As per the complainant, the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of the petitioner. Accordingly, initially FIR No. 0148, dated 04.10.2020, under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, came to be registered against petitioner, however, when challan was presented, Section 338 of the Indian Penal Code was incorporated. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, Annexure P2 and in order to maintain their relations cordial, they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that offence of rash and negligent driving is an offence against the society and it cannot be permitted to be compounded/quashed, so the present petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsels for respondents No. 2 and 3 have argued that taking into consideration the fact that parties have settled their dispute amicably, the present petition may be allowed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the records in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under :

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends