ORDER :

The instant petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No.88/2016 dated 13.5.2016, under Sections 376 (2) (N) and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter to be called as “IPC”), Section 4 of the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 3 (12) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities), Act, 1989, registered at Police Station, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stating the facts giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that respondent No.2 made a complaint to the police alleging therein that on 13.5.2016, around 8:45 a.m, when she went to Nalagarh College, for appearing B. Com 2nd Year Semester, where the petitioner met her and denied for appearing in the exam and told that her brother has been kidnapped. When respondent No.2, came out from College alongwith his motorcycle towards Kirpalpur, where the petitioner tried to rape her and also threatened her. As a sequel to the statement of respondent No.2, police registered an FIR against the petitioner. Now, respondent No.2 entered into a compromise, on the basis of compromise deed, dated 18.3.2021 (Annexure P-5), stating therein that she does not want to pursue the case against the petitioner. However, respondent No.2 has attained majority, aged 24 years and having one son about two years old and they are living happily. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power o