ORDER :

1. The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”), is maintained by the petitioner for quashing of F.I.R No. 65/2016, dated 21.03.2016, under Sections 279, 337 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station Sadar, District Bilaspur, H.P., alongwith all consequent proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that on 21.03.2016, respondent No. 2/complainant made a complaint, wherein, it has been alleged that on 20.03.2016, around 8:15 P.M., when after closing his shop, he was going to his house and reached at place City Chowky, he saw a car and a scooty passing from there at very high speed. After some distance both car and scooty collided with each other and and rider of the scooty received injuries on his head and face. As per the complainant the accident took place on account of rash and negligent driving of both the petitioners. Accordingly, FIR No. 65/2016, dated 21.03.2016, under Sections 279, 337 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act, came to be registered against petitioners. However, now the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise Deed, Annexure P1 and in order to maintain their relations cordial, they do not want to pursue the case against each other. Hence the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P1), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings alive, hence the FIR, alongwith consequent proceedings, arising out of the same, pending before the learned trial Court may be quashed and set aside.

4. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2/complainant has argued that taking into consideration the fact that parties have settled their dispute amicably, the present petition may be allowed.

5. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that offence of rash and negligent driving is an offence against the society and it cannot be permitted to be compounded/quashed, so the present petition may be dismissed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the records in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necess