The main legal point established in the judgment is the court's authority to quash criminal proceedings in appropriate cases to meet the ends of justice, especially when the parties have compromised the matter.

JUDGMENT :

CHANDER BHUSAN BAROWALIA, J.

1. The present Criminal Revision Petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called as the Cr.P.C.) against the order dated 05.05.2015, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmaur, District at Nahan, H.P. on an application under Section 321 of the Cr.P.C. in Case No. 1/3 of 2015, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Vipul Kumar Kapadi, pending before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, H.P.

2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that Case No. 1/3 of 2015 has been presented against the petitioner for allegedly having committed offences under Sections 43, 65, 66 and 72 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 before the learned trial Court in case FIR No. 177/2011, dated 17.08.2011, registered at Police Station, Sadar Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. During the course of the proceedings, an application under Section 321 of the Cr.P.C. has been filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh for withdrawal of the case with the plea that the complainant/respondent No. 2 has amicably compromised the dispute with the accused/petitioner (hereinafter called as 'the petitioner’). However, the learned trial Court has not appreciated the compromise between the parties and vide its order, dated, 25.06.2014, issued notice to the complainant and the complainant appeared before the trial Court on 22.07.2014 and made a statement that the matter was compromised with the petitioner, as such, the complainant has no objection if the same is withdrawn by the State, but the learned Trial Court has come to the conclusion that permission to withdraw the case cannot be granted and vide order dated 05.05.2015, dismissed the application and ordered to put up the case for consideration on charge. Feeling aggrieved by the decision of learned trial Court, the petitioner preferred the present petition.

3. In the present matter, challan for having committed offences under Sections 43, 65, 66 and 72 of the Information Technology, Act, 2000, was presented against the petitioner. It is alleged that petitioner was appointed as Deputy Manager (Master Batch) vide appointment letter dated 27.05.2007. At the time of his appointment, the company’s E-mail ID, i.e. vipulkapadi@silkolite.com, was provided to him and he was conferred the power to use propriety data relating to colour development and de-codification of company shade numbers in the company shade card. It is also alleged that company’s ID was solely in possession of the petitioner and the said Id was used by the petitioner for handling the various secrets, developments and trace data of the company. The petitioner, without the consent of the company, had transferred many trade secrets of the company to his personal Id. It is further alleged that the secrets of the company's developments, stolen by the petitioner, not only caused financial loss to the company, but also the same have been misappropriated by the petitioner. Police after investigating the matter, came to the conclusion that petitioner in order to take profit, sent data shade through his E-mail ID to other concerns, as such committed offences under Sections 43, 65, 66 and 72 of the Information Technology, Act, 2000.

4. The complainant, who lodged the complaint, has appeared before the learned Court below and stated that the matter has been compromised with the petitioner. If the complainant, whose ID was misused by the petitioner, has settled their dispute, this Court finds that no fruitful purpose will be served by keeping the complaint alive.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case carefully.

6. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar