IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
Tersam Singh, S/o Sh. Attar Singh - Appellant
Vs.
State Of Himachal Pradesh - Respondent
Criminal Misc. Petition (Main) U/S 482 CRPC No.259 OF 2022
Decided On : 13-05-2022
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482, 320 - of Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 279, 337, 338 - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Sections 181 and 196 - Rash driving or riding on a public way – Quash FIR - Whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, High Court must evaluate whether ends of justice would justify exercise of inherent power - Whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on ground that offender and victim have settled dispute, revolves ultimately on facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated - High Court would be justified in declining to quash where offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanor(Para 16.10).
Findings of Court- Court find that interest of justice will be met, in case, proceedings are quashed, as parties have already compromised matter - Accordingly, looking into all attending facts and circumstances, Court find this case to be a fit case to exercise jurisdiction vested in this Court, under Section 482 of Code and accordingly F.I.R, dated 30.9.2012 under Sections 279, 337, 338 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 181 and 196 of Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station Paonta Sahib, is ordered to be quashed. Consequently, proceedings pending before learned Trial Court, arising out of aforesaid FIR, are also ordered to be quashed and petitioners-accused are acquitted of charges framed against them.
Result - Petition disposed of
ORDER :
The present petition is maintained by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) for quashing of F.I.R No.373 of 2012, dated 30.9.2012 under Sections 279, 337, 338 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 181 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, registered at Police Station Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. along with all consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.
2. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that respondent No.2/complainant made a written complaint to the police alleging therein that on 30.9.2012 at place Badripur, Activa Scooty bearing registration No.HP17-C-0165 struck against a vehicle i.e. Pulser motorcycle bearing registration No.HP-17A-7489 in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and personal safety of others, as a result of which, driver alongwith one pillion rider of the aforesaid Activa Scooty sustained injuries. On the basis of the aforesaid information given by the complainant, the instant FIR came to be lodged. After completion of the investigation in the aforesaid FIR, police filed challan arraying both the petitioners, as accused in the learned Court below, but before the same could be taken to its logical end, petitioners, who are accused in the aforesaid challan have approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for quashing of FIR as well as consequential proceedings on the basis of Compromise Deed (Annexure P-2) dated 31st March, 2022. Hence, the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.
5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the parties have entered into compromise, so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.
6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.
7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:
[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of qua
B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another
Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others (1998) 5 SCC 749
Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand and another
Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal & Others
Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and another
Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others vs. State of Gujarat and another
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.