The central legal point established in the judgment is the need to exercise the powers under section 482 of the Code sparingly and with great caution, particularly in cases of matrimonial disputes, and the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements and meet the ends of justice.

JUDGMENT :

Rajiv Sharma, J.

1. Petitioner has sought quashing of FIR No.80/2011 dated 21.8.2011 under sections 498-A, 403, 406 and 506 read with section 34 I.P.C. registered at Police Station, Gagret, District Una and the subsequent proceedings arising thereof, i.e. Criminal Case No. 481/2013.

2. "Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that marriage between petitioner No.1 and respondent No.3 was solemnized in the year 2008. Two children were born out of the wedlock. However, due to mismatch of temperaments and mutual differences, respondent No.3 filed complaint against the petitioners, which led to registration of FIR No. 80/2011. However, with the intervention of the relative and respectable members of the community, petitioner No.1 and respondent No.3 decided to live together for their better future. They are living together for the one and half years. They have entered into compromise vide Ex.P-2.

3. Since the parties have compromised the matter, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings pending against the petitioner.

4. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675 have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.

5. Their Lordships of the Honble Supreme Court in Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and another, (2010) 7 SCC 667 have held that the ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. The tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of the criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. The criminal trials lead to immense sufferings for all concerned. Their Lordships have further held that permitting complainant to pursue complaint would be abuse of process of law and the complaint against the appellants was quashed. Their Lordships have held as un