The main legal point established in the judgment is that the interest of justice can be served by quashing criminal proceedings, especially in cases of matrimonial disputes where parties have settled amicably.

JUDGMENT :

Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.

1. The present petition is maintained by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter to be called as "the Code") for quashing F.I.R No. 0011, dated 18.01.2016, under Section 498-A, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal code, registered at Police Station, Shimla Sadar, District Shimla, H.P. along with all consequential proceedings arising out of the above mentioned F.I.R.

2. Briefly stating the facts, giving rise to the present petition are that the marriage between the petitioner No. 1/husband (hereinafter to be called as "petitioner No. 1") and respondent No. 3/wife (hereinafter to be called as "respondent No. 3") was solemnized on 23.03.2003, as per Hindu customs and tradition, out of the said wedlock a male child was born, who is presently residing with respondent No. 3. Since 21.01.2015, petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 3 are living separately, on account of temperamental differences and mental incompatibility. After intervention of family friends/relatives, petitioner No. 1 and respondent No. 3 had decided to dissolve their marriage by the decree of divorce by mutual consent. The parties have entered into a compromise vide compromise deed executed on 02.04.2016 (Annexure P- 2), wherein total settlement amount of Rs. 90,00,00/- (Rupees ninety lac) is to be paid by petitioner No. 1 to respondent No. 3, as full and final settlement, towards her claims i.e., Istridhan, alimony and maintenance, out of which a sum of Rs. 40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lac) had already been received by respondent No. 3 in first motion, recorded on 10.08.2016 in the Court of Principal Judge (South East), Family Courts, Saket, New Delhi (Annexure P-3). The remaining amount of Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lac) shall be paid at the time of recording of statement in second motion. Now, both the parties have entered into a compromise and do not want to pursue the case against each other.

3. Respondents No. 1 & 2/State by filing reply to the petition prays that the proceedings are pending adjudication before the learned Court below, hence the present petition deserves to be dismissed.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, vide Compromise Deed (Annexure P-2), no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan pending before the learned Court below may be quashed and set aside.

5. On the other hand, learned Deputy Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition be dismissed.

6. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 has argued that the parties have entered into compromise and so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below be quashed.

7. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

8. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

(6) In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others (1998) 5 SCC 749, this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers h