Point of Law: Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute

ORDER :

1. The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) for quashing of F.I.R No.96 of 2020, dated 24.4.2020, under Sections 341, 323, 504, 506, 509 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Shimla West, District Shimla, H.P; alongwith all consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.

2. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that respondent No.2 made a written complaint to the police alleging therein that on 24.4.2020 around 4:45 p.m, she was talking to Professor Sarswati Devi on mobile phone outside her quarter, the petitioner pulled hairs from her back and by throwing her on the airs, started beatings with legs and fist blows, as a result of which, respondent No.2 received injuries on her right arm and left leg. On hearing her cries, Smt. Kiran, Smt. Kanta Devi and Smt. Sneha, all residents of Shano Niwas, came on the spot and tried to save her from the petitioners. On the basis of the complaint given by the complainant, the instant FIR came to be lodged. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise deed (Annexure P-2) stating therein that the complainant does not want to pursue the case against the petitioners. Hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioners and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned Deputy Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the parties have entered into compromise, so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.

6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.

7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is morepower, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under:

[6] In Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others ((1998) 5 SCC 749), this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the Court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise