IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
Harish Kumar S/o Sh. Daya Ram - Appellant
Vs.
State Of Himachal Pradesh - Respondent
Criminal Misc. Petition (Main) U/S 482 CRPC No.752 Of 2022
Decided On : 01-09-2022
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 279, 504, 34 - Compromise deed - Rash and negligent driving – Rash driving or riding on a public way - Savings of inherent powers of High court - Whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated - Power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. (Para 16.6).
Finding of the Court:
Court find that interest of justice will be met in case proceedings are quashed, as parties have already compromised the matter - Court find this case to be a fit case to exercise jurisdiction vested in this Court, under Section 482 of Code and accordingly F.I.R, under Section 279 of Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station is ordered to be quashed and consequently, proceedings pending before learned Trial Court, arising out of aforesaid FIR, are also ordered to be quashed.
Result: Petition disposed of.
ORDER :
The present petition is maintained by the petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) for quashing of F.I.R No.43 of 2018 dated 18.3.2018, under Sections 279, 504 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. alongwith all consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.
2. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that respondent No.2 made a written complaint to the police alleging therein that on 17.3.2018 around 9:30 p.m, his father called him and told that due to excessive work in the Office, he will get late and asked him to come near OMS hotel for picking him up. Respondent No.2 alongwith his friend reached at OMS hotel in his vehicle bearing registration No.HP30-5437 and parked his car on the side of the road. Both were sitting in the car, around 10:05 p.m, vehicle bearing registration No.HP30-5437 came from the side of Main bazar Karsog, at a high speed and hit the car of respondent No.2, due to which, vehicle of respondent No.2 was damaged from the conductor side. Thereafter, the vehicle was stopped and the driver of the vehicle, who was drunk started abusing respondent No.2 and one Rajesh Kumar. On the basis of statement of the complainant, FIR in question was registered. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise deed (Annexure P-3) stating therein that he does not want to pursue the case against the petitioners. Hence, the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.
5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that the parties have entered into compromise, so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.
6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.
7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under :
[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a diff
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