IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J.
Sh. Vikas Kumar S/o Sh. Baljeet Singh - Appellant
Vs.
State Of Himachal Pradesh Through Principal Secretary Home To The Govt. OF H.P. - Respondent
Criminal Misc. Petition (Main) U/S 482 CRPC No.786 Of 2022
Decided On : 01-09-2022
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 279 - Compromise deed - Rash and negligent driving – Rash driving or riding on a public way - Savings of inherent powers of High court - Whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated - Power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. (Para 16.6)
Finding of the Court :
Court find that the interest of justice will be met, in case, the proceedings are quashed, as the parties have already compromised the matter - Court find this case to be a fit case to exercise jurisdiction vested in this Court, under Section 482 of the Code and accordingly F.I.R, under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Dhalli, is ordered to be quashed and consequently, proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court, arising out of aforesaid FIR, are also ordered to be quashed.
Result: Petition disposed of.
ORDER :
The present petition is maintained by the petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be called as “the Code”) for quashing of F.I.R No.110 of 2019 dated 15.6.2019, under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Dhalli, District Shimla, H.P. alongwith all consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., pending before the learned trial Court.
2. Briefly stated the facts, giving rise to the present petition, as per the prosecution story, are that respondent No.2 made a written complaint to the police alleging therein that on 15.6.2019 around 12:30 p.m. an accident took place between vehicle bearing registration No.HP63A-2150, being driven by him with another vehicle bearing registration No.CH01TB-9188, which was being driven by the petitioner in a rash and negligent manner, as a result of which, vehicle bearing registration No.HP63A-2150 got damaged in the said accident. This accident has taken place due to the rash and negligent driving of the petitioner. On the basis of statement of the complainant, FIR in question was registered. Now, the parties have entered into a compromise, vide Compromise deed (Annexure P-1) stating therein that he does not want to pursue the case against the petitioner. Hence, the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that as the parties have compromised the matter, no purpose will be served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner and the FIR/Challan, may be quashed and set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the offence is not compoundable, so the petition may be dismissed.
5. Learned counsel for respondents No.2 and 3 submits that the parties have entered into compromise, so, the proceedings pending before the learned Court below may be quashed.
6. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail.
7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another, (2003) 4 SCC 675, have held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Their Lordships have held as under :
[8] It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.
[15] In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code
B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana and another
Pepsi Food Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others (1998) 5 SCC 749
Preeti Gupta and another vs. State of Jharkhand and another
Inder Mohan Goswami and Another v. State of Uttaranchal & Others
Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others vs. Babita Raghuvanshi and another
Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others vs. State of Gujarat and another
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