Point of Law: Section 138 of Act specifies strong criminal remedy in relation to dishonour of cheques, rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in course of litigation.

JUDGMENT :

Sandeep Sharma, J.

Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 397 of Cr.PC read with Section 401 Cr.PC, lays challenge to judgment dated 11.12.2018, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shimla, Camp at Rohru, HP, in Criminal Appeal No. 26-R/10 of 2018, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06/16.8.2018, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Rohru, District Shimla, H.P., in Case No. 16-3 of 2016, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.10,00,000/- to the complainant.

2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that complainant being known to the accused, on his request advanced sum of Rs.7.00 lac to him, who with a view to discharge his liability, issued cheque bearing No. 059092 dated 28.10.2015 amounting to Rs.7,00,000/- drawn at SBI Branch Mori, but fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned, was dishonoured. Since petitioner-accused failed to make the payment good within the time stipulated in the legal notice, respondent/complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings before the competent Court of law under Section 138 of the Act.

3. Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, vide judgment dated 6/16.8.2018, held the petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per the description given herein above.

4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction recorded by the court below, accused preferred an appeal in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Shimla, Camp at Rohru, H.P, which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 11.12.2018, as a consequence of which, judgment of conviction recorded by the learned trial Court came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, present petitioner-accused has approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his acquittal after setting aside the judgment of conviction recorded by the court below.

5. Vide order dated 2.5.2019, this Court suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the court below subject to petitioner’s depositing 50% of the compensation amount, however fact remains that aforesaid order never came to be complied with and matter was repeatedly adjourned on the request of learned counsel for the petitioner-accused, enabling him to make the payment. Though at one point of time, undertaking was also given by the petitioner to this court that he will pay the entire amount, but fact remains that neither amount was deposited nor petitioner despite repeated orders came present before this Court and as such, this court has no option, but decide the case on its own merits.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the judgment passed by the courts below, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the same, rather same appear to be based upon proper appreciation of the evidence led on record by the respective parties. Neither issuance of cheque nor signature thereupon has been denied by the accused, rather in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.PC, he has simply stated that he had issued blank cheque in favour of the complainant as security. Since accused never disputed the factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signature thereupon, there is presumption in favour of the complainant in terms of provisions contained in Section 118 and 139 of the Act that cheque was issued in his favour for discharge of lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but for that purpos