The main legal point established is the strict adherence to Section 309 of Cr.P.C., requiring expeditious trials and continuous examination of witnesses, with adjournments only granted for special reasons.

JUDGMENT :

(Rakesh Kainthla, J.)

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the order dated 15.10.2022, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. vide which the right to lead evidence was closed. It has been asserted that the respondent had filed a complaint against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The petitioner was permitted to lead the defence evidence. The petitioner filed a list of defence witnesses and also deposited the diet money of the witnesses on 30.4.2022. Learned Trial Court did not issue the summons to the witnesses and wrongly closed the evidence by the order of the Court. Learned Trial Court erred in holding that adjournment was not justified as several opportunities had been availed by the petitioner. The order does not mention the number of opportunities taken by the petitioner. The whole case of the petitioner has been materially prejudiced. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order dated 15.10.2022, passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

2. I have heard Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Dibender Ghosh, learned Counsel for the respondent.

3. Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in closing the defence evidence. Adequate opportunity was not granted to the petitioner to lead defence evidence. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

4. Mr. Dibender Ghosh, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner was granted more than adequate opportunities to lead the defence evidence but he failed to do so. Learned Trial Court had rightly closed the right to lead defence evidence. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.

6. A perusal of the order sheet of the learned Trial Court reads that no defence evidence was produced despite the cost of Rs.5,000/- imposed upon the petitioner. The last opportunity was afforded to him to adduce the evidence subject to the payment of the cost. No further adjournment was justified. Hence, the evidence was closed by the order of the Court.

7. Section 309 of Cr.P.C. confers the power on a Criminal Court to grant adjournment. It provides that the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible and the adjournment can be granted on adequate reasons. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh, (2001) 4 SCC 667 that it is not permissible to grant adjournment except for adequate reasons. It was observed:-

10. Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) is the only provision which confers power on the trial court for granting adjournments in criminal proceedings. The conditions laid down by the legislature for granting such adjournments have been clearly incorporated in the section. It reads thus:

“309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings.—(1) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded.

(2) If the court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody:

Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to