IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU
R.P. Sethi, J.
Ram Parshad - Appellant
Versus
Prem Nath - Respondent
Civil Second Miscellaneous Appeal No. 5/1983
Decided On : 24 March, 1993
Limitation - Execution Application - Order XXI C.P.C. - [PERIOD OF LIMITATION, NULLITY OF DECREE, PECUNIARY JURISDICTION] - Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1963, Order XXI C.P.C., S. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, Shyam Nandan Sahay and ors. v. Dhanpati Kuer and Ors (AIR 1960 Patna 244), Gosto Behari Pramanik v. Smt. Malati sen and ors (AIR 1985 Calcutta 379), Ramesh Chander v. Bhusban Lal (AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 345), Abdul Razaq vs Izat Ali (AIR 1979 All 23), Ram krishan Bajirao Gotmare v. Kanhaiyalal Tribhuwanlal Shah (AIR 1990 Bombay 361)
Fact of the Case:
The respondent-decree-holder obtained an exparte decree in arbitration proceedings. The judgment debtor raised objections regarding the limitation for execution and the nullity of the decree due to the court's lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. The objections were rejected by the executing court and the appellate court.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the executing court is bound by the terms of the decree and cannot go beyond its scope, except when the decree is found to be a nullity. The lack of pecuniary jurisdiction is not fundamental and can be waived by the parties. The time for filing an application for execution of the decree runs from the date of the appellate decree, as per the doctrine of merger.
Issues: Period of limitation for execution application, nullity of decree due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction
Ratio Decidendi: The lack of pecuniary jurisdiction is not fundamental and can be waived by the parties. The time for filing an application for execution of the decree runs from the date of the appellate decree, as per the doctrine of merger.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the interim direction of the Court was vacated.
The respondent-decree-holder obtained an exparte decree in arbitration proceedings after the award filed by the arbitrator was made a rule of the Court by the trial court of sub Judge, Udhampur, on 29-1-74. While passing the decree in terms of the award, it was held that the judgment debtor would be the owner of vehicle No. JKA/1815 and the plaintiff-decree holder entitled to the receipt of Rs. 5,000 in lump sum alongwith interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum with effect from 12.12,1969 till the whole amount was paid. While filing application for execution of the decree in the executing court, the respondent-decree-holder claimed a sum of Rs. 5,000 in terms of the decree and Rs. 3,100 on account of interest awarded, total being Rs. 8,100/-. It was contended on behalf of the judgment-debtor that as the decree was passed on 29.1 1974 and the application for execution was filed on 28.4.1980 admittedly after 3 years, same could not be executed and that the application was barred by time. It was further contended that the decree was nullity because the Court passing it had no pecuniary jurisdiction. The decree-holder contended that as the appeal filed against the decree of the trial court remained pending upto 31.8.1977, it cannot be said that the application filed by the decree-holder was barred by time as the period allegedly spent in litigation could not be computed for the purposes of limitation. The objections raised were rejected both by the executing court and the appellate court below vide the orders impugned in this appeal.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
It is now well settled proposition of law that the executing court is bound by the terms of the decree and cannot go beyond its scope and determine any objection raised by the judgment-debtor during execution proceedings. The only exception is that where a decree is found to be nullity, the executing court is not under a legal obligation to execute it. Similarly an application filed after the period of limitation for execution of the decree, may not be executable. It is also acknowledged that the jurisdiction of a civil court to try a suits is of three kinds, viz: (i) jurisdiction with reference to the nature of the suit, (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction, and (iii) territorial jurisdiction. Where the Court has jurisdiction to try a suit it has the jurisdiction to decide every question arising in the suit and its decree. Similarly where any law sets out the jurisdiction of the Court in general terms and does not particularise the remedies or processes whereby that jurisdiction may be exercised then the conferment of jurisdiction includes the authority to issue such direction or process as is necessary to enforce it. However, where a suit or proceeding is instituted in a court having no jurisdiction to try it, defect is fatal one and cannot be cured by subsequent transfer to a court having jurisdiction to try the said cause. The question of pecuniary jurisdiction of a court cannot be raised on h ground of erroneous valuation in a subsequent suit challenging the decision of a court, under Sec. 6 CPC. The pecuniary jurisdiction is determined which provides that "save in so far as is otherwise expressly provided, nothing contained in the C. P. C. shall operate to give any court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value of the subject matter of which exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of its ordinary jurisdiction". It was held by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Shyam Nandan Sahay and ors. v. Dhanpati Kuer and Ors (AIR 1960 Patna 244) that, "distinction is required to be drawn between
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