1. By the medium of this appeal appellants have questioned the judgment and order dated 9.7.2008 passed by the Principal District Judge, Srinagar in an applica­tion, titled as State of J&K v. M/S P. P. Poulouse, on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal (hereinafter, for short, impugned order).

2. Appellants invoked the jurisdiction of Principal District Judge, Srinagar in terms of Section 34 of J&K Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1997 (hereinafter, for short, Act) for setting aside the award dated 15.11.2003 passed by the arbitrators. It is averred that appellants/applicants got the knowledge of the award only on 17.12.2004, thus the petition made was within time. It is profitable to reproduce para 9 of the said petition herein

"9. That since the applicants got knowledge of the award only on 17.12.2004 when Hon'ble Court issued notice to applicant and immediately applica­tion for certified copy of the award was made to Hon'ble Court as the arbitrator had neither furnished the copy of the award to applicants nor notified the same to them. Therefore, the time of limitation will be deemed to start from the date the applicant receives the notices from the court."

3. Respondents-non-applicants filed objections and resisted the petition on the plea that motion was belated. Learned District Judge after hearing learned counsel for the parties passed the impugned order and held that the petition was barred by time and, accordingly, dismissed the same. It is observed in the impugned order that the award was opened in presence of learned counsel for the parties in the open court on 6.10.2004. The appellants/applicants were also aware of passing of the award on 15.11.2003 itself as per the dates, minutes and events maintained by the arbitrators and, accordingly, held that appellants acquired the knowledge about the award on 15.11.2003 and also on 6.10.2004. Learned District Judge also held that the appellants avoided or failed to pay costs/fees to the arbitrators, thereby avoided to receive copy of the award and, accordingly, held that the petition was time barred. It is appropriate to reproduce operative parts of the impugned order herein:

"The covering letter of the award which was received by the court suffi­ciently indicates that such copies were ready to be forwarded to the parties and were not so forwarded because of non-payment of the arbitration fee and the incidental charges. If a party to the arbitration proceedings willfully avoids to pay the arbitration fee and allows the Arbitral Tribunal to exercise lien over the award, such party cannot turn around and complain that it was not provided the signed copy of the award in terms of section 31(5) of the Act and that time to file an application under section 34(3) for setting aside of the award shall start running from the date when he at his choice obtained certified copy of the award..."

"and if the applicants avoided or failed to receive the copy or directly or indirectly thwarted its delivery, the applicants cannot file application in terms of section 34(3) of the Act for setting aside of the award after delay of more than one and half years i.e. much beyond the period prescribed, on the plea that the copy of the award was not delivered by the arbitral tribunal, when the applicant by avoiding to pay the fee and incidental charges made it practically impossible for the arbitral tribunal to deliver the original copy of the award. So viewed, the application is time barred and liable to be dismissed. In the circumstances, the application being hit by limitation, rendered not maintainable, is dismissed. It shall go to records after due compilation."

4. The core question involved in this appeal is whether limitation for filing an application under section 34 of the Act for setting aside an arbitral award will start to run from the date copy of the award is received by the objector by any source, method or means, or from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to him by the arbit

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