Back
2014 Supreme(J&K) 316
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU
Dhiraj Singh Thakur, J.
Uttam Chand -Appellant
Versus
State & Ors. -Resopndent
SWP No. 2179-11
Decided On : 21-08-2014
Sudesh Sharma, Ravinder Sharma, M.K. Sharma.
The court emphasized that delay and laches are not inviolable rules but are based on the discretion of the court, and should be considered in each case based on the facts and circumstances.
Headnote:
Delay and Laches - Selection and Appointment Challenge - [Article 226, Limitation Act] - The court discussed the principles of delay and laches in writ proceedings, emphasizing that delay and laches are not inviolable rules but are based on the discretion of the court. The court also highlighted the importance of delay in creating third party interests and the reasonableness of the period for seeking remedy under Article 226. The judgment emphasized that delay and laches should be considered in each case based on the facts and circumstances.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner challenged the selection and appointment of a private respondent as Education Volunteer, claiming to be more meritorious. The respondents argued that the petition should be dismissed due to delay and laches.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the petition was barred by delay and laches, emphasizing the inequity of allowing the challenge at a belated stage after the petitioner remained silent for several years.
Issues: Challenge to selection and appointment, delay and laches
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principles of delay and laches in writ proceedings, considering the discretion of the court, the creation of third party interests, and the reasonableness of the period for seeking remedy under Article 226.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed due to delay and laches.
2. The challenge rests on the ground that the petitioner being more meritorious than the respondent No. 5, was entitled for appointment as Education Volunteer.
3. Objections have been filed by the respondents. Respondents 1 to 4 have taken a stand that the present petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
4. Respondent No.5, in its objections has stated that the petitioner had neither applied for the post in question nor had participated in the process of selection initiated in the year 2004.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
6. With a view to overcome the difficulty of delay of laches in filing the present petition, counsel for the petitioner urged that number of representations were filed by the petitioner agitating the selection and appointment of private respondent No.5, which were never properly responded by the official respondents. Copies of these representations dt. 8.3.2010 and 8.7.2010, have been placed on record.
7. The mere fact that the petitioner had filed representations, that too, as late as in the year 2010, would not amount to justifying the silence of the petitioner for as many as six years from the date, the cause of action had accrued to him.
8. How the courts have dealt with the issue of delay and laches in writ proceedings can briefly be noticed as under:-
In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra & ors, (1974) 1 SCC 317, the Apex court held that there was no inviolable rule whenever there was delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition under Article 226. The question was one of discretion to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of each case. Delay and laches was not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion.
9. Another principle that was laid down by the Apex Court and followed in R&M Trust v. Koramangala Residents Vigilance Group & Ors, (2005) 3 SCC 91, was that delay would be an important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, if the same had resulted in creation of third party interest.
10. The third principle as regards delay and laches can be noticed in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006, which stated that the maximum period fixed by the legislature for grant of relief in a civil suit would ordinarily be reasonable standard for fixing the period to determine delay in seeking remedy under Article 226. The Apex court in the said case observed as under:
"The provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. However; the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable."
11. However, it does not lay down, as a matter of principle, that in every case, where a petition is filed within the period, which is otherwise prescribed for filing a civil suit for a particular relief, the court must, as a matter of rule, accept the petition and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226. Reference in this regard can be made to the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628, where even five months delay was considered to be fatal. The Apex Court in the said judgment observed as follows:
"Moreover, the wr
